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SUMMARY 
 
Cruise ship industry is rapidly developing, with both the vessels size and number constantly growing up, which renders 
ensuring passengers, crew and ship safety a paramount necessity. Collision, grounding and fire are among the most 
frequent accidents on cruise ships with high consequences. In this study, a hazard analysis of diesel-electric and hybrid-
electric propulsion system is undertaken using System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). The results demonstrate 
significant increase in potential hazardous scenarios due to failures in automation and control systems, leading to fire and 
a higher number of scenarios leading to propulsion and power loss in hybrid-electric propulsion systems than on a 
conventional cruise-ship propulsion system. Results also demonstrate that STPA enhancement is required to compare the 
risk of two propulsion systems. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Developments over the recent past have driven the 
maritime industry towards reducing exhaust gas emissions 
and fuel consumption. Specific areas have been 
designated, the so-called Emission Control Areas (ECAs), 
where stringent limits for NOx and SOx emissions are 
applied [1]. At the same time, considerable reduction in 
the attained Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), 
which is used to depict the vessel CO2 emissions, is 
required by the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) from new built vessels [1]. In addition, the 
maritime industry is going through periods of high fuel 
prices, resulting in high operating costs. Furthermore, in 
2018, Norway has adopted a resolution to achieve zero-
emissions in world heritage fjords the latest by 2026 with 
application to cruise ships and ferry vessels [2]. The above 
render attractive the use of alternative fuels and propulsion 
systems, including Hybrid-Electric Propulsion (HEP) with 
hybrid power supply, where diesel-generators and 
batteries are used to ship power needs, and pure electrical 
propulsion, where batteries are used to store the energy 
required for ship functions, to meet the regulatory 
requirements in a cost-effective way. 
 
Hybrid-electric and pure electric propulsion systems have 
already been applied on a number of existing vessels, 
while new vessels with HEP are under development. MV 
Viking Lady, an offshore supply vessel equipped with 500 
kWh battery system has been in operation since 2013 [3]. 
MV Ampere is the world’s first fully electric battery 
powered ferry vessel with battery capacity of 1,040 kWh 
deployed on a route in Norway [4]. MV Hallaig, MV 
Lochinvar and MV Catriona ferries, three sister vessels 
with 700 kWh battery capacity on each, are currently in 
operation in Scotland [5]. Two cruise ships with HEP 
system, allowing ship sailing by using batteries for 30 
minutes are expected to be delivered in 2019 [6]. A 
hybrid-electric icebreaker cruise ship is under 
development by PONANT, Stirling Design International, 
Aker Arctic and VARD with scheduled ship delivery in 
2021 [7]. Considering that battery technology is being 
constantly developed, with increasing energy density and 
decreasing procurement cost [8], it can be expected that 
use of batteries will be extended to larger size cruise ships 
in the near future. 
 
The HEP achieves energy efficiency improvement by 
running D/G sets at optimum load by peak load shaving 
and functioning as spinning reserve [8-10]. 
Implementation of HEP leads to D/G sets downsizing, 
which also supports D/G sets operation at their most 
efficient load ranges [8]. Other advantages include higher 
redundancy in system and lower emissions due to 
charging of batteries from local grid in harbour [8, 10]. 
Disadvantages include relatively high cost of batteries 
procurement [8, 10], large batteries size and weight [9], 
limited number of recharging cycles [9] and addition of 
new hazardous scenarios to the system [8].  
 
On cruise ships though, with passenger number equivalent 
to a number of inhabitants of a town, ensuring safety of 
propulsion system is paramount as any malfunctions may 
lead to propulsion loss and, in turn, to collision, contact or 
grounding, which may end up in significant human loss 
[11-13]. In addition, the introduction of batteries can lead 
to an increased risk of fire, explosion and crew 
intoxication [8]. A fire on hybrid-electric tugboat occurred 
due to malfunction of Battery Management System[14], 
whilst a number of similar events have occurred in other 
industries.  In this respect, it is crucial to ensure that all 
these scenarios are identified and properly addressed 
during the system design.  
 
The primary reference for designing safe systems is the 
IMO regulations [15] and classification society rules [16]. 
However, additional hazard and risk assessment studies 
may be required to ensure safe design and class approval 
[15, 16].  The only available and known safety study on 
HEP system is given in [3], which is a high level study. 
Other studies have referred to potential safety issues on 
HEP systems but did not follow a hazard identification 
method for their analysis [14]. Pertinent literature reveals 
the research gap, which is a hazard analysis of HEP system 
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using well-established or novel methods and comparison 
with the standard diesel-electric propulsion. The research 
gap leads to the aim of this study, which is to analyse the 
safety of HEP system using System-Theoretic Process 
Analysis and to compare it with standard Diesel-Electric 
Propulsion (DEP) in terms of the developed hazards, 
number of potential hazardous scenarios and causal 
factors. 
 
This paper is organised as following. In section two, the 
selected method and the rationale behind the method are 
presented. In section three, a short description of the 
system and system functionalities is provided. In section 
four, the analysis results and safety recommendations are 
given. In section five, the main findings of this study are 
summarised.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Hazard identification and analysis is the process of 
defining all possible scenarios or sequences of events, 
which can lead to a hazard realisation [17]. A number of 
traditional methods can be used for analysis of power 
propulsion systems including Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA), HAZard and Operability studies 
(HAZOP) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) [17]. However, these methods have been 
criticised for not addressing properly the automation 
functions in the system [17-20]. Control and automation 
though has an important role for power generation on 
cruise ships using either standard or diesel-electric or 
hybrid-electric propulsion system [21]. For this reason, the 
System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) method has 
been selected for hazard identification. Another advantage 
of STPA is that it can be implemented on functional level, 
not requiring the exact details of the system and vessel. In 
this way the identified hazardous scenarios will have 
applicability to other ship types and similar propulsion 
systems. The method steps are presented in Figure 1 and 
described in more detail in the following. 
STPA defines the accident as: “an undesired and 
unplanned event that results in loss, including loss of 
human life or human injury, property damage, 
environmental pollution, mission loss, financial loss, etc.” 
[22]. The hazards in the STPA framework are understood 
as: “system states or set of conditions that together with a 
worst-case set of environmental conditions, will lead to an 
accident” [22]. The hazards in STPA are viewed on a 
system level, so they go beyond the single failures that 
may occur in the system and should be referred to a 
specific state of the system. Sub hazards are considered 
states in a worst-case scenario leading to hazard 
realisation. Generic requirements can be specified, based 
on the hazards and sub hazards.  
 
The development of a functional control structure is one 
of the differentiating points of the STPA analysis, 
compared with the other methods [22]. Usually, it starts 
with a high-level abstraction of the system and proceeds 
to a more detailed system description. The initial control 
structure consists of the high-level controller, the human 
operator and the controlled process with the basic control, 
feedback and communication links.  A more detailed 
description would incorporate a hierarchy of controllers. 
Both high-level and detailed control structure can be used 
for the safety analysis at different system design stages. 
 
After the development of the basic control structure, the 
next step is its refinement. The required actions include 
the identification a) of each controller responsibilities; b) 
of the process model with process variables and potential 
process variable values; c) of the control actions; d) the 
behaviour of the actuators; e) the information from the 
sensors; f) the information from the other controllers.  
 
The actual hazards identification starts by finding the 
Unsafe Control Actions (UCAs). The possible ways to 
proceed are either by using the control actions types as 
initially proposed for the STPA [23] or by using the 
context tables as proposed in [18]. Herein, the second of 
the two approaches has been selected. According to both 
approaches, the possible UCAs can be of the following 
seven types [22]:  
 Not providing the action leads to a hazard. 
 Providing of a UCA that leads to a hazard. 
 Providing the control action too late.  
 Providing the control action too early. 
 Providing the control action out of sequence. 
 Control action is stopped too soon  
 Control action is applied for too long. 
 
According to the STPA, there is also another type of UCA, 
when the safe control action is provided but is not 
followed. This type of failure mode is addressed during 
the identification of causal factors in the second step of the 
method. Similarly, with the system hazards, safety 
constraints can be derived for the UCAs, aiding the 
identification of possible safety barriers. 
 
Figure 1 STPA steps. 
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The second step in the hazard identification of the STPA 
has the purpose of determining all the scenarios and causal 
factors leading to the UCAs. This is done by examining 
the hazardous scenarios including software and physical 
failures as well as design errors. There are several ways to 
organize the results of the hazardous scenarios by using 
tables or lists. In this work, the process was augmented by 
a checklist, developed on the basis of previous studies [24, 
25]. The main categories of causal factors are:  
 Inappropriate control input 
 Hardware failure 
 Software faulty implementation 
 Software faulty design 
 Erroneous or missing input 
 Inadequate control command transmission 
 Flawed execution due to faults in actuator or 
physical process 
 Conflicting control actions 
3. SYSTEMS DESCRIPTION 
 
The conventional diesel-electric and hybrid-electric 
propulsion system single line diagram is presented in 
Figure 3 whilst functional control structure for both 
systems is given in Figure 2. Two switchboards and 
engine rooms are available to comply with Safe Return to 
Port rules requirements [26]. The power network is of the 
Alternate Current type. It has been also assumed that DEP 
plant operates with the bus-tie circuit breaker connected. 
Power Management System (PMS) starts/stops the 
engines based on ship consumers electric load demand. 
Switchover between the plant Diesel Generators (D/G) is 
implemented based on the D/G sets running hours. The 
PMS can implement a fast-electrical load reduction for the 
propulsion motors and bow thrusters as well as 
preferential tripping functions (fast load reduction) by 
tripping Heat Ventilation Air Conditioning (HVAC) units. 
 
Figure 2 Functional control structure. 
Figure 3 Single line diagram of conventional and hybrid power network.  
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The D/G sets operate in the droop mode and their power 
output is regulated by speed governor and Automatic 
Voltage Regulator (AVR). Several safety systems are used 
to trip D/G sets and propulsion motors if a fault had been 
observed. The DEP control network is also considered to 
be isolated from other networks, so no hazardous 
scenarios are developed in the system because of cyber-
attacks. It is also considered that the human operator 
neither reduces nor introduces new hazards. 
 
In the investigated HEP system, in addition to the 
components present in conventional DEP, one battery 
pack per switchboard with current converter is considered. 
The battery output and condition are controlled by a 
dedicated Battery Management System (BMS) which 
monitors the actual battery health state and the battery and 
cell capacity and controls the battery cells charge status, 
the discharging/charging rate, the converters power output 
and the battery auxiliary systems. The BMS 
communicates with PMS to determine the actual power 
status and power demand implementing in this way the 
Energy Management System functions. The BMS also 
communicates with fire-fighting systems to determine the 
battery operating status. Battery capacity is considered 
adequate to cover the whole ship power demand for a 
limited period. The battery has been considered of Li-Ion 
type.  
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Based on previous Formal Safety Assessment studies, the 
following causality scenarios can be considered as 
accidents [27]:  
 Collision [A-1] 
 Contact [A-2] 
 Grounding [A-3] 
 Fire [A-4] 
 Explosion [A-5] 
 Machinery damage [A-6] 
 Foundering [A-7] 
 Operating personnel injury or death [A-8] 
These accidents are not fully disjoint, as a fire can lead to 
collision and vice versa [28]. In addition, numerous 
hazards can be connected to the accidents on a cruise ship 
and there can be interactions between different hazards. 
Herein, the most important and those related to the system 
under analysis are referred to [11, 27]: 
 Propulsion loss [H-1] leading to collision, 
contact and grounding accidents. The propulsion 
loss can be further developed into the following 
sub hazards: 
o D/G sets overload [H-1-1]. 
o Transients [H-1-2]. 
o Imbalanced power generation [H-1-3] 
o D/G sets unavailability [H-1-4] 
o Batteries unavailability [H-1-5] 
o Propulsion motors unavailability [H-1-
6] 
 Flammable liquid on hot surfaces in the engine 
room and other conditions leading to [H-2] fire 
in engine room. 
 Uncontrolled electrical faults in equipment 
leading to [H-3] fire and explosions in system 
components or blackout (propulsion loss). 
 Toxic/flammable atmosphere in battery room 
leading to crew intoxication or fire [H-4]. 
 Anomalous conditions in batteries leading to fire 
and thermal runaway [H-5].  
 Arson – deliberate act resulting in fire [H-6]. 
 Human erroneous operation [H-7] 
 Cyber-attack leading to any of previous hazards 
[H-8]. 
 Water ingress [H-9] 
Although, it is acknowledged that there is contribution 
from hazards [H-6]-[H-9] to the overall system risk, these 
hazards can be considered as external to the system 
presented in Figure 3 and Figure 2 and thus their analysis 
has been omitted. 
 
The developed control structure has been already provided 
in Figure 2. The difference between the two propulsion 
systems can be found in the presence of Battery 
Management System and additional interactions between 
the fire-fighting system and the propulsion system. The 
description of responsibilities of each controller and their 
control actions, although necessary for the analysis have 
been omitted for brevity purposes. 
 
In total, 160 and 228 potential UCAs have been identified 
in DEP and HEP system, respectively. The increase in 
UCAs number can be attributed to the increase in the 
number of control actions implemented by BMS. 
However, as it can be viewed, it leads to a significant 
increase in the number of potential UCAs (more than 
40%). The distribution of UCAs per hazards is given in 
Figure 5. As it can be seen from this figure, the number of 
hazardous scenarios other than propulsion loss, leading to 
fire or crew intoxication is significantly higher in the 
investigated HEP system in comparison with the DEP 
system. The number of scenarios leading to propulsion 
loss is also significantly higher. These results do not 
necessary imply that the risk level is higher in the 
investigated hybrid-electric system than the risk in 
conventional DEP system, rather that there are much more 
paths to the accident in hybrid-electric systems than in 
DEP, which must be carefully controlled. This also 
indicates that a successful cyber-attack on a hybrid-
electric vessel will lead to more hazardous scenarios than 
in conventional cruise ship vessels. 
Power & Propulsion Alternatives for Ships, 23rd January 2019, London, UK 
© 2019: The Royal Institution of Naval Architects 
 
The distribution of UCAs failure modes for the 
investigated HEP system is given in Figure 6. The results 
for the DEP are similar to HEP system. As it can be 
observed from Figure 6, the primary failure modes are 
related either to failure to implement the intended control 
action or to implement the intended action in time or 
commission errors. These types of control actions as well 
as actions applied in wrong order are related to the 
designed safety functions or automated control actions in 
the investigated system. Stopped too late, stopped too 
soon and applied too early were related mostly to control 
actions implemented by the investigated system PID 
controllers. 
 
In total, 2,225 and 1,523 causal factors have been 
identified for the hybrid-electric and the conventional 
diesel-electric propulsion systems. The causal factors 
distribution for the HEP system is given in Figure 4. The 
results for the conventional DEP are similar. As it can be 
observed, most scenarios are dependent on installed 
control software errors, either controller design or 
implementation errors. Errors in sensors have also been 
identified as potential causal factors. 
 
Based on the conducted analysis and the derived results 
comparison, the following safety recommendations can be 
made: 
 In HEP systems, adequate means must be 
provided to prevent and mitigate scenarios 
leading to fire to ensure that the hazardous 
scenarios leading to fire do not lead to higher risk 
in hybrid-electric system than in the conventional 
system. This includes systems responsible for 
batteries temperature management and fire-
fighting and proper selection of location for 
batteries. 
 System operational conditions must be 
thoroughly understood and addressed in system 
design. This includes the batteries and actuators 
degradation mechanisms, potential modifications 
in the systems and software updates during 
operation and maintenance. 
 Rigorous testing of the system control actions 
must be implemented for ensuring their 
functionality during the design, development and 
trial phase according to hazardous identification 
process in both diesel-electric and hybrid-electric 
system. The development and test cost in hybrid-
electric system will be higher since the number 
of scenarios to be addressed is also higher. 
From the STPA application to the conventional diesel-
electric and HEP system an extensive list of safety 
requirements for the employed control systems has been 
derived. However, some of the STPA restrictions have 
been revealed during the analysis. Potentially, more 
scenarios could be identified if more refined system 
representation was used. In addition, STPA is applied for 
scenarios development, but did not allow risk estimation 
and scenarios ranking, so the only discussion about 
potential safety implications can be in terms of hazardous 
scenarios. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this study, the STPA has been applied for hazard 
identification and analysis of a diesel-electric and hybrid-
electric propulsion systems. Through its application, 
hazardous scenarios in automation and control system 
have been identified and compared. 
 
The main findings can be summarised as follows: 
Figure 5 UCAs distribution per hazards. 
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Figure 4 Distribution of causal factors. 
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 Hazardous scenarios leading to fire accidents are 
significantly more in HEP systems, thus they 
must be carefully controlled. 
 Scenarios number leading to propulsion loss and 
potential collision, contact, grounding is also 
higher in HEP systems than in conventional DEP 
systems. 
 Failure modes and potential causal factors 
distributions are similar in hybrid-electric and 
diesel-electric propulsion systems. 
 Special attention must be paid to software design, 
software testing, sensors redundancy and 
batteries location in hybrid propulsion system. 
 An improvement in STPA method must be 
considered to allow ranking of different 
scenarios and estimating risk. 
In summary, the results indicate the high importance of 
proper operation of control and automation systems for 
diesel-electric and hybrid-electric systems safety. A 
potential future work could investigate the risk level in 
more detail by improving the STPA method. 
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